Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous
                                
                         George Berkeley
                                
                              1713
                                

Copyright 1996, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for
details on copyright and editing conventions. This text file is
based on the 1910 Harvard Classics edition of Berkeley's . Pagenation follows T.E. Jessop's 1949 edition of
, in , Vol. 2.
This is a working draft; please report errors.[1]

                             * * * *
                                
                         THREE DIALOGUES
                             Between
                       HYLAS AND PHILONOUS
                                
  The Design of which is Plainly to Demonstrate the Reality and
                          Perfection of
                                
                         HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
                  The Incorporeal Nature of the
                                
                              SOUL
                And the Immediate Providence of a
                                
                              DEITY
                        In Opposition to
                                
                      SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS
                                
   Also to Open a Method for Rendering the Sciences More Easy,
                     Useful, and Compendious
                                
                                

{171}

                       THE FIRST DIALOGUE

     . Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find
you abroad so early.

     . It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts
were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night,
that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a
turn in the garden.

     . It happened well, to let you see what innocent and
agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a
pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the
year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the
fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence
of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of
nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties too
being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those
meditations, which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of
the morning naturally dispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt
your thoughts: for you seemed very intent on something.

     . It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you
will permit me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any
means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts always flow
more easily in conversation with a friend, than when I am alone:
but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart my
reflexions to you.

     . With all my heart, it is what I should have
requested myself if you had not prevented me.

     . I was considering the odd fate of those men who have
in all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished from
the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended
either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most
extravagant things in the world. This however might be borne, if
their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some
consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief
lieth {172} here; that when men of less leisure see them who are
supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of
knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or
advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly
received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions
concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto
held sacred and unquestionable.

     . I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of
the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical
conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of
thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime notions I
had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it you
on my word; since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the
plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find my
understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily
comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and
riddle.

     . I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I
heard of you.

     . Pray, what were those?

     . You were represented, in last night's conversation,
as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever
entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing
as  in the world.

     . That there is no such thing as what , I am seriously persuaded: but, if I
were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should
then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have
now to reject the contrary opinion.

     . What I can anything be more fantastical, more
repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of
Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as ?

     . Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that
you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater
sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to Common
Sense, than I who believe no such thing?

     . You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than
the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I
should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point.

     . Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for
true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to
Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism?

     . With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes
{173} about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once
to hear what you have to say.

     . Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a ?

     . I mean what all men mean -- one that doubts of
everything.

     . He then who entertains no doubts concerning some
particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a
sceptic.

     . I agree with you.

     . Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the
affirmative or negative side of a question?

     . In neither; for whoever understands English cannot
but know that  signifies a suspense between both.

     . He then that denies any point, can no more be said
to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of
assurance.

     . True.

     . And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to
be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

     . I acknowledge it.

     . How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you
pronounce me , because I deny what you affirm, to wit,
the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as
peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation.

     . Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my
definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not
to be insisted on. I said indeed that a  was one who
doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the
reality and truth of things.

     . What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems
of sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual
notions, and consequently independent of Matter. The denial
therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.

     . I grant it. But are there no other things? What think
you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of
sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not
this sufficient to denominate a man a ?

     . Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that
denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest
ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be
{174} esteemed the greatest ?

     . That is what I desire.

     . What mean you by Sensible Things?

     . Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can
you imagine that I mean anything else?

     . Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to
apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry.
Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things
only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or,
may those things properly be said to be  which are
perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?

     . I do not sufficiently understand you.

     . In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are
the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested
to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the
letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there
is no doubt: but I would know whether you take the things
suggested by them to be so too.

     . No, certainly: it were absurd to think  or
 sensible things; though they may be signified and
suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an
arbitrary connexion.

     . It seems then, that by  you mean
those only which can be perceived  by sense?

     . Right.

     . Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one
part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth
thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that
diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a
sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?

     . It doth.

     . In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet
I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?

     . You cannot.

     . And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot
and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel
the cause of its heat or weight?

     . To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell
you once for all, that by  I mean those only
which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses
perceive nothing which they do not perceive : for
they make no {175} inferences. The deducing therefore of causes
or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are
perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.

     . This point then is agreed between us -- That
. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately
perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and
figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate,
anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the
touch, more than tangible qualities.

     . We do not.

     . It seems, therefore, that if you take away all
sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

     . I grant it.

     . Sensible things therefore are {250} nothing else but
so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible
qualities?

     . Nothing else.

     .  then is a sensible thing?

     . Certainly.

     . Doth the  of sensible things consist in
being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being
perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?

     . To  is one thing, and to be  is
another.

     . I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of
these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a
subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being
perceived?

     . I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and
without any relation to, their being perceived.

     . Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must
exist without the mind?

     . It must.

     . Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally
compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there
any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to
others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.

     . Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may
be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

     . What! the greatest as well as the least?

     .  tell you, the reason is plainly the same in
respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the
greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and
consequently, if there is {176} any difference, we are more
certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a
lesser degree.

     . But is not the most vehement and intense degree of
heat a very great pain?

     . No one can deny it.

     . And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or
pleasure?

     . No, certainly.

     . Is your material substance a senseless being, or a
being endowed with sense and perception?

     . It is senseless without doubt.

     . It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

     . By no means.

     . Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by
sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?

     . I grant it.

     . What shall we say then of your external object; is
it a material Substance, or no?

     . It is a material substance with the sensible
qualities inhering in it.

     . How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own
it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this
point.

     . Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense
heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something
distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

     . Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you
perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct
sensations?

     . But one simple sensation.

     . Is not the heat immediately perceived?,

     . It is.

     . And the pain?

     . True.

     . Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived
at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple
or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is
both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and,
consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is
nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.

     . It seems so.

     . Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can
conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.
{177}

     . I cannot.

     . Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible
pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular
idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c.

     . I do not find that I can.

     . Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is
nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense
degree?

     . It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to
suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving
it.

     . What! are you then in that sceptical state of
suspense, between affirming and denying?

     . I think I may be positive in the point. A very
violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.

     . It hath not therefore according to you, any 
being?

     . I own it.

     . Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in
nature really hot?

     . I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I
only say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat.

     . But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat
were equally real; or, if there was any difference, that the
greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser?

     . True: but it was because I did not then consider the
ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now
plainly see. And it is this: because intense heat is nothing else
but a particular kind of painful sensation; and pain cannot exist
but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense heat can
really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is
no reason wh' we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist
in such a substance.

     . But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of
heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without
it?

     . That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain
cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is
a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of
heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them.

     . I think you granted before that no unperceiving
being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.

     . I did. {178}

     . And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat
than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?

     . What then?

     . Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an
unperceiving substance, or body.

     . So it seems.

     . Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that
are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking
substance; may we not conclude that external bodies are
absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever?

     . On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that
warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.

     .  do not pretend that warmth is as great a
pleasure as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a
small pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion.

     . I could rather call it an . It seems to be
nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that
such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking
substance, I hope you will not deny.

     . If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a
gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince
you otherwise than by appealing to your own sense. But what think
you of cold?

     . The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold
is a pain; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great
uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a
lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.

     . Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to
our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded
to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them; and those,
upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be
thought to have cold in them.

     . They must.

     . Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a
man into an absurdity?

     . Without doubt it cannot.

     . Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing
should be at the same time both cold and warm?

     . It is.

     . Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other
cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of
{179} water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem
cold to one hand, and warm to the other?

     . It will.

     . Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to
conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that
is, according to your own concession, to believe an absurdity?

     . I confess it seems so.

     . Consequently, the principles themselves are false,
since you have granted that no true principle leads to an
absurdity.

     . But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to
say, ?

     . To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in
two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?

     .. We ought.

     . When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and
divide the fibres of your flesh?

     . It doth.

     . And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?

     . It doth not.

     . Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation
itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the
pin; you should not, conformably to what you have now granted,
judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or anything like it,
to be in the fire.

     . Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this
point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations
existing in our minds. But there still remain qualities enough to
secure the reality of external things.

     . But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear
that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible
qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist without
the mind, than heat and cold?

     . Then indeed you will have done something to the
purpose; but that is what I despair of seeing proved.

     . Let us examine them in order. What think you of
, do they exist without the mind, or no?

     . Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is
sweet, or wormwood bitter?

     . Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind
of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not? {180}

     . It is.

     . And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or
pain?

     . I grant it.

     . If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking
corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness
and bitterness, that is, Pleasure and pain, agree to them?

     . Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was delude time.
You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular
sorts of pleasure and pain; to which simply, that they were.
Whereas I should have thus distinguished: those qualities, as
perceived by us, are pleasures or pair existing in the external
objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is
no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that
heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or
sugar. What say you to this?

     . I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse
proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you
defined to be, . Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of as
distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at
all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to
have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and
assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But
what use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a
loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that
heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities
which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the
mind?

     . I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up
the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it
sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet.

     . But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along
with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a
distempered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer
than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same
food; since that which one man delights in, another abhors. And
how could this be, if the taste was something really inherent in
the food?

     . I acknowledge I know not how.

     . In the next place,  are to be considered.
And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath
{181} been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are
they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations?

     . They are.

     . Can you then conceive it possible that they should
exist in an unperceiving thing?

     . I cannot.

     . Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect
those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the
same smells which we perceive in them?

     . By no means.

     . May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the
other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but
a perceiving substance or mind?

     . I think so.

     . Then as to , what must we think of them: are
they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?

     . That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain
from hence: because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an
air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be
thought the subject of sound.

     . What reason is there for that, Hylas?

     . Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we
perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's
motion; but without some motion in the air, we never hear any
sound at all.

     . And granting that we never hear a sound but when
some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can
infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air.

     . It is this very motion in the external air that
produces in the mind the sensation of . For, striking on
the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the
auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is
thereupon affected with the sensation called .

     . What! is sound then a sensation?

     . I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular
sensation in the mind.

     . And can any sensation exist without the mind?

     . No, certainly.

     . How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the
air, if by the  you mean a senseless substance existing
without the mind?

     . You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it
is {182} perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is
the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and
that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular
kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or
undulatory motion the air.

     . I thought I had already obviated that distinction,
by answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before.
But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is
really nothing but motion?

     . I am.

     . Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with
truth be attributed to motion?

     . It may.

     . It is then good sense to speak of  as of a
thing that is , , , .

     .  see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it
not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible
sound, or  the common acceptation of the word, but not
to  in the real and philosophic sense; which, as I just
now told you, is nothing but a certain motion of the air?

     . It seems then there are two sorts of sound -- the
one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and
real?

     . Even so.

     . And the latter consists in motion?

     . I told you so before.

     . Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you,
the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

     . No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.

     . It should follow then, that, according to you, real
sounds may possibly be , but never .

     . Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a
jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things.
I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something
oddly; but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the
use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions
adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the
way.

     . Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself
to have gained no small point, since you make so light of
departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part
of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the {183}
common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the
world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical
paradox, to say that , and that the
idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there
nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?

     . To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the
concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too
have no real being without the mind.

     . And I hope you will make no difficulty to
acknowledge the same of .

     . Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can
anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?

     . The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal
Substances existing without the mind?

     . They are.

     . And have true and real colours inhering in them?

     . Each visible object hath that colour which we see in
it.

     . How! is there anything visible but what we perceive
by sight?

     . There is not.

     . And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do
not perceive immediately?

     . How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing?
I tell you, we do not.

     . Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more,
whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses,
except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but
I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same
opinion.

     . I do.

     . Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible
quality, or made up of sensible qualities?

     . What a question that is! who ever thought it was?

     . My reason for asking was, because in saying, , you make
visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either
that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that
there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight:
but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still
maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your
 is nothing distinct from . {184}

     . You may draw as many absurd consequences as you
please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you
shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my
own meaning.

     . I wish you would make me understand it too. But,
since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal
substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be
pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see
exist in external bodies, or some other.

     . The very same.

     . What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see
on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in
themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?

     . I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really
in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only
apparent colours.

     .  call you them? how shall we distinguish
these apparent colours from real?

     . Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which,
appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.

     . And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which
are discovered by the most near and exact survey.

     . Right.

     . Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help
of a microscope, or by the naked eye?

     . By a microscope, doubtless.

     . But a microscope often discovers colours in an
object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight.
And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned
degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever, viewed through
them, would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the
naked eye.

     . And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot
argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects:
because by artificial managements they may be altered, or made to
vanish.

     . I think it may evidently be concluded from your own
concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are
only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a
more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a
microscope. Then' as to what you say by way of prevention: {185}
I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is
better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one
which is less sharp?

     . By the former without doubt.

     . Is it not plain from  that microscopes
make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they
would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a
most exquisite sharpness?

     . It is.

     . Consequently the microscopical representation is to
be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the
thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, by it
perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived
otherwise.

     . I confess there is something in what you say.

     . Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that
there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to
perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape
our sight. What think you of those inconceivably small animals
perceived by glasses? must we suppose they are all stark blind?
Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the
same use in preserving their bodies from injuries, which appears
in that of all other animals? And if it hath, is it not evident
they must see particles less than their own bodies; which will
present them with a far different view in each object from that
which strikes our senses? Even our own eyes do not always
represent objects to us after the same manner. In the jaundice
every one knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore
highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very
different texture from that of ours, and whose bodies abound with
different humours, do not see the same colours in every object
that we do? From all which, should it not seem to follow that all
colours are equally apparent, and that none of those which we
perceive are really inherent in any outward object?

     . It should.

     . The point will be past all doubt, if you consider
that, in case colours were real properties or affections inherent
in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration without
some change wrought in the very bodies themselves: but, is it not
evident from what hath been said that, upon the use of
microscopes, upon a change happening in the burnouts of the eye,
or a variation of distance, without any manner of real alteration
{186} in the thing itself, the colours of any object are either
changed, or totally disappear? Nay, all other circumstances
remaining the same, change but the situation of some objects, and
they shall present different colours to the eye. The same thing
happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of light. And
what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently
coloured by candle-light from what they do in the open day? Add
to these the experiment of a prism which, separating the
heterogeneous rays of light, alters the colour of any object, and
will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the
naked eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that
every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and, if you
think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain
distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture and
formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary
for ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from
apparent ones.

     . I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all
equally apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour
really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether in
the light. And what confirms me in this opinion is, that in
proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid; and
if there be no light, then are there no colours perceived.
Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet, how
is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external body
affects the mind, unless it acts first on our organs of sense.
But the only action of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be
communicated otherwise than by impulse. A distant object
therefore cannot act on the eye; nor consequently make itself or
its properties perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly follows
that it is immediately some contiguous substance, which,
operating on the eye, occasions a perception of colours: and such
is light.

     . Howl is light then a substance?

     .. I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but
a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated
with a brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from the
different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, communicate
different motions to the optic nerves; which, being propagated to
the brain, cause therein various impressions; and these are
attended with the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.

     . It seems then the light doth no more than shake the
optic nerves. {187}

     . Nothing else.

     . And consequent to each particular motion of the
nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some
particular colour.

     . Right.

     . And these sensations have no existence without the
mind.

     . They have not.

     . How then do you affirm that colours are in the
light; since by  you understand a corporeal substance
external to the mind?

     . Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I
grant cannot exist without the mind. But in themselves they are
only the motions and configurations of certain insensible
particles of matter.

     . Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the
immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving
substance.

     . That is what I say.

     . Well then, since you give up the point as to those
sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind
beside, you may hold what you please with regard to those
invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my business to
dispute about ; only I would advise you to bethink
yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we are upon, it be
prudent for you to affirm -- , . Are not these shocking
notions, and are not they subject to as many ridiculous
inferences, as those you were obliged to renounce before in the
case of sounds?

     . I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to
longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed
, have certainly no existence without the
mind. But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to
derogate, the reality of Matter, or external objects; seeing it
is no more than several philosophers maintain, who nevertheless
are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer
understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by
philosophers divided into  and . The former
are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest; {188}
and these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those
above enumerated; or, briefly, ; which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas
existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt not, you
are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time sensible
there was such an opinion current among philosophers, but was
never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.

     . You are still then of opinion that  and
 inherent in external unthinking substances?

     . I am.

     . But what if the same arguments which are brought
against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also?

     . Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist
only in the mind.

     . Is it your opinion the very figure and extension
which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or
material substance?
     . It is.

     . Have all other animals as good grounds to think the
same of the figure and extension which they see and feel?

     . Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.

     . Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed
upon all animals for their preservation and well-being in life?
or were they given to men alone for this end?

     . I make no question but they have the same use in all
other animals.

     . If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by
them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are
capable of harming them?

     . Certainly.

     . A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own
foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some
considerable dimension; though at the same time they appear to
you scarce discernible, or at best as so many visible points?

     . I cannot deny it.

     . And to creatures less than the mite they will seem
yet larger?

     . They will.

     . Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to
another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain?
{189}

     . All this I grant.

     . Can one and the same thing be at the same time in
itself of different dimensions?

     . That were absurd to imagine.

     . But, from what you have laid down it follows that
both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the
mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals,
are each of them the true extension of the mite's foot; that is
to say, by your own principles you are led into an absurdity.

     . There seems to be some difficulty in the point.

     . Again, have you not acknowledged that no real
inherent property of any object can be changed without some
change in the thing itself?

     . I have.

     . But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the
visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred
times greater than another. Doth it not therefore follow from
hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object?

     . I own I am at a loss what to think.

     . Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will
venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have
done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument,
that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because it seemed
warm to one hand and cold to the other?

     . It was.

     . Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there
is no extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it
shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it
appears to the other, great, uneven, and regular?

     . The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?

     . You may at any time make the experiment, by looking
with one eye bare, and with the other through a microscope.

     . I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to
give up , I see so many odd consequences following
upon such a concession.

     . Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I
hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness. [But, on the
other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the general reasoning
{190} which includes all other sensible qualities did not also
include extension? If it be allowed that no idea, nor anything
like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely
it follows that no figure, or mode of extension, which we can
either perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really
inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there
must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct
from extension to be the  of extension. Be the
sensible quality what it will -- figure, or sound, or colour, it
seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which doth not
perceive it.][2]

     . I give up the point for the present, reserving still
a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover
any false step in my progress to it.

     . That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and
extension being despatched, we proceed next to . Can a
real motion in any external body be at the same time very swift
and very slow?

     . It cannot.

     . Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal
proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space?
Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times
faster than it would in case it described only a mile in three
hours.

     . I agree with you.

     . And is not time measured by the succession of ideas
in our minds?

     . It is.

     . And is it not possible ideas should succeed one
another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that
of some spirit of another kind?

     . I own it.

     . Consequently the same body may to another seem to
perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth
to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to any other
proportion: that is to say, according to your principles (since
the motions perceived are both really in the object) it is
possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way
at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent
either with common sense, or with what you just now granted?
{191}

     . I have nothing to say to it.

     . Then as for ; either you do not mean any
sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry:
or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both
the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses: it
being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft
to another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is
it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body.

     . I own the very  of resistance, which is
all you immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the 
of that sensation is.

     . But the causes of our sensations are not things
immediately perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point
I thought had been already determined.

     . I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a
little embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions.

     . To help you out, do but consider that if 
be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the
same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and
gravity; since they all evidently suppose extension. It is
therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of
them. In denying extension, you have denied them all to have any
real existence.

     . I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why
those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real
existence should yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no
difference between them, how can this be accounted for?

     . It is not my business to account for every opinion
of the philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be
assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being
rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and
cold, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or
disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure, and motion
affect us with. And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that
pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance, men are
more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the
Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there
is something in this, if you recollect the difference you made
between an intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the
one a real existence, while you denied it to the other. But,
after all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for,
surely an indifferent sensation is as {191} truly 
as one more pleasing or painful; and consequently should not any
more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject.

     . It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have
somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible
extension. Now, though it be acknowledged that  and
, consisting merely in the relation which other extended
beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere
in the substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the
same with regard to , which is something
abstracted from  and , from this or that particular
magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion;  and 
are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own
minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of
motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion
abstracted from them doth not.

     . Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or
one part of extension, from another? Is it not something
sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain
magnitude or figure peculiar to each?

     . I think so.

     . These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible
properties, are without all specific and numerical differences,
as the schools call them.

     . They are.

     . That is to say, they are extension in general, and
motion in general.

     . Let it be so.

     . But it is a universally received maxim that
. How then can motion in
general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal
substance? {193}

     . I will take time to solve your difficulty.

     . But I think the point may be speedily decided.
Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or
that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If
you can frame in your thoughts a distinct  of
motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as
swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like,
which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then
yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be
unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have
no notion of.

     . To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

     . Can you even separate the ideas of extension and
motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make
the distinction term ?

     . What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension
and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible
qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?

     . I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form
general propositions and reasonings about those qualities,
without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or
treat of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because
I can pronounce the word  by itself, I can form the idea
of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be
made of extension and figures, without any mention of  or
, or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it
is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any
particular size or figure, or sensible quality,[3 ] [should be
distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians
treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible.
qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to
their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they
contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not
the pure abstracted ideas of extension.

     . But what say you to ? May not
abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?

     . Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is
plain I cannot frame them by the help of ; {194}
whatsoever faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to
inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual
objects, as , , , or the like, thus much
seems manifest -- that sensible things are only to be perceived
by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore,
and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong
to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you
can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all
particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities.

     . Let me think a little -- I do not find that I can.

     . And can you think it possible that should really
exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?

     . By no means.

     . Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind
to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other
sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist
there necessarily the other exist likewise?

     . It should seem so.

     . Consequently, the very same arguments which you
admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are,
without any farther application of force, against the Primary
too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all
sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the
same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being
divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?

     . You need say no more on this head. I am free to own,
if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings
hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied
existence without the mind. But, my fear is that I have been too
liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or
other. In short, I did not take time to think.

     . For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you
please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at
liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or offer
whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion.

     . One great oversight I take to be this -- that I did
not sufficiently distinguish the